"Household Responses for Pricing Garbage by the Bag," by Don Fullerton & Thomas C. Kinnaman
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
HOUSEHOLD DEMAND FOR GARBAGE
AND RECYCLING COLLECtiON WITH
THE START OF A PRICE PER BAG
Don Fullerton
Thomas C. Kinnaman
Working Paper No. 4670




We are grateful for suggestions from Linda Babcock, John Engberg, Phil Heap. Debbie
Nestor, Ed Olsen, Hilary Sigman, Jon Skinner, Steve Stern, Lowell Taylor, Margaret Walls.
and seminar participants at NBER. Virginia, Carnegie-Mellon. Georgia, Vanderbilt, Oregon
and Texas. We are also grateful for funding from NSF grant SES91-22785, and from the
Bankard Fund at the University of Virginia. This paper is part of NBER's research program
in PublicEconomics.Any opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily
represent those of the National Science Foundation or the National Bureau of Economic
Research.NBER Working Paper #4670
March1994
HOUSEHOLDDEMAND FOR GARBAGE
AND RECYCLING COLLECTION WITH
THE START OF A PRICE PER BAG
ABSTRACT
This paper estimates household reactionto theimplementation of unit-pricing for the
collection of residential garbage. We gather original data on weight and volume of weekly
garbage and recycling of 75 households in Charlottesville, Virginia, both before and after the start
of a program that requires an eighty-cent sticker on each bag of garbage. This data set is the first
of its kind. We estimate household demands for the collection of garbage and recyclable
material, the effect on density of household garbage, and the amount of illegal dumping by
households. We also estimate the probability that a household chooses each method available
to reduce its garbage.
In response to the implementation of this unit-pricing program, we find that households
(I) reduced the weight of their garbage by 14%. (2) reduced the volume of garbage by 37% and
(3) increased the weight of their recyclable materials by 16%. We estimate that additional illegal
--orat least suspicious --disposalaccounts for 0.42 pounds per person per week, or 28% of the
reduction in garbage observed at the curb.
Don Fullerton Thomas C. Kinnarnan
Heinz School of Public Policy and Management Department of Economics
Carnegie-Mellon University University of Virginia
Pittsburgh, PA 15213 Charlottesville, VA 22901
and NBER1. Introduction
Rising land prices and new EPA regulations are largely responsible for the tripling
over a six-year period of the avenge Upping fee paid to a landfill for accepting each ton of
garbage from collectors (Steuteville and Goldstein, 1993). Several communities and private
firms have responded to these economic pressures by implementing volume-based pricing
programs that require households to pay for each bag or can of garbage presented for
collection. These towns employ unit-pricing not only to collect additional revenue, but to
reduce their direct costs and external costs from using landfills and incinerators. Households
might recycle more, compost more, and demand less packaging at stores. Unfortunately,
they might also burn garbage or dump it along deserted roads. The attractiveness of unit-
pricing depends crucially on the extent of each such method of garbage reduction.
In addition, the price-per-bag might induce households to compact their garbage into
fewer bags. Thispracticewas noticed when Seattle started one of the first unit-pricing
programs, so it is known as the "Seattle Stomp." It is not helpful, since collectors compact
the garbage anyway.
This paper employs individual household data to estimate the effect of price and
demographic variables on the weight of garbage, the number of containers, the weight per
can, and the amount of recycling. We also estimate the probability that a household will
choose each method of garbage reduction listed above, The data are based on a natural
experiment that provides a uniqueopportunity to study human behavior in response to a
change in price. In Virginia, on July 1, 1992, the City of Charlottesville implemented a
program to charge $..80per 32-gallon bag of residential garbage collected curbside,
Before and after the implementation of this program, we counted and weighed the2
bagsor cans of garbage and recyclable materials of 75 households. In response to this new
price, theavengeperson living in these households:
•reduced the weight of garbage from 10.89 pounds per week to 9.37 pounds per
week(a 14.0 % decrease),
• reduced the volume of garbage from 0.73 containers per week to 0.46 containers
per week(a37.0 % decrease),
•increased the densityof garbage from 14.79 pounds per container to 19.48 pounds
per container (a 31.7% increase), and,
• increased the weight of recyclable material presented for collection from 3.69
pounds per week to 4.27 pounds per week (a 15.7% increase).
Also, we estimate that increased illegal disposal accounts for 0.42 pounds per week per
person in Charlottesville, or 28% of the total reduction in garbage.
Other studies have estimated household demand for the collection of garbage, often
using data for entire communities. Cross-sections of cities are employed by McFarland
(1972), Wertz (1976), Jenkins (1991), and Repetto et a! (1992). Aggregate time series data
collected from one community are used by Efaw and L.anen (1979) and Skumatz and
Breckinridge (1990).' Household surveys have appeared more recently. Hong, Adams, and
Love (1993) use a survey of 2298 households around Portland,Oregon, where 25 collection
firms operate in 19 municipalities using a variety ofblock-pricing schedules (such as
$12/month for one can per week and $24/month for two cans).They estimate the demand
'Also, Stevens (19Th and Kemper and Quigley (1976) use a cross-section of several
cities to examine the effectsontotal demand from a change in the level of service for
garbage collection. With a cross-section of neighborhoods, Richardson and Havlicek(1978)
and Rathje and Thompson (1981) consider the effect that theneighborhood's avenge income
has on the demand for the collection of specific categories ofgarbage material. Another
body of literature used telephone interviews with individual households to estimaterecycling
attitudes and behavior (see Oskainp et aL, 1991, forexample).3
for cans contracted, correcting for the endogeneity of price, and they estimate the frequency
that each household will recycle. They find small response to changes in price or income.
Finally, Reschovsky and Stone (1994) survey 1422 households around Ithaca, NY, who face
a variety of unit-pricing and recycling rules. They estimate the probability of recycling each
type of material, as a function of these rules and of demographic characteristics, and they
find that curbside pickup alone would increase recycling more than unit-pricing alone.
We build upon these existing studies in several ways. First, by using individual
households instead of a cross-section of cities, we avoid a number of problems. Tonnage
data from entire communities might mix residential garbage with commercial and industrial
garbage,2 and may include amounts from outside the jurisdiction. Second, by collecting our
own data, we avoid potential biases in surveys with self-reported amounts of garbage and
recycling. Third, we measure the garbage itself, rather than the weekly number of cans
contracted (some of which may be partially empty). Fourth, by taking direct measures of
both weight and volume, we can measure the Seattle Stomp, that is, the change in weight per
can. Fifth, our data include the weight of recycling rather than just the frequency of
recycling. Sixth, in our natural experiment, the change in price is truly exogenous to
households. We thus avoid the problem in cross-sections of cities, or of households in
different municipalities, that the price per bag may be jointly determined with garbage
quantities. Finally, our cross-section of individual households contains more variation in
demographic characteristics than does a cross-section of communities, since the latter can
only provide community-wide means. More variation in the independent demographic
variables can improve the estimation of household demand.
2Jenkins (1991) and Cargo (1978) employ such data by estimating separate equations for
commercial waste and mixed waste.4
Section2 will describethesteps taken to gather the data from individual households
in Charlottesville. In section 3, we estimate demand for garbage collection and curbside
recycling as functions of price,income, anddemographic characteristics. Garbage weight is
inelasticto priceor income, but garbage volumedoesrespond to this price per unit volume.
Section 4 estimates whethertheobserved price-responsiveness itself dependsondemographic
characteristics.We employ a probit model in section 5 to estimate the probability that a
household chooses each method available to reduce its garbage. These choices are identified
through responses to a questionnaire. Then section 6 estimates the amount of illegal
dumping conducted by households in Charlottesville following the implementation of the
program. This estimate is based on observed garbage levels from individual households, and
indirectly on responses to the questionnaire. Finally, in section 7, we consider policy issues.
We discuss the pros and cons of collecting revenue from per-unit pricing, we calculate the
effect of introducing a minimum of one bag per week, and we conduct a simple cost-benefit
comparison. Welfare gains from unit-pricing only exceed costs if those costs are less than
10% of unit-pricing revenue.
2. TheData
Charlottesville, Virginia, is a university town located in the foothills of the Blue
Ridge mountains. Its population is 40,341. Residential garbage collection has traditionally
been provided by the city and has been financed byaty taxes. Prior to November of
1991, the only method of recycling was to haul recyclable materials to one of two drop-off
centers located within the city. These drop-off centers accepted newspaper, three colors of
glass, and aluminum cans. Beginning in November of 1991, Charlottesville implemented a
voluntary curbside recycling program for all of its residents. The city provided eachS
household with a free plastic recycling container in which to place any newspaper, tin, glass,
aluminum, and certain plastics. These containers were collected each week on the same thy
as regular garbage. The city also expanded the list of materials it would accept at the drop-
off locationsby includingseveral other grades of paper, cardboard, and other plastics.
InDecember1991, city council decided to implement a unit-pricing program to
commence on July1,1992. This program would require residents to placea sticker,costing
on each unit of garbage for collection. Each sticker could be attached to any
household container (bag or can) with a volume of approximately 32 gallons. The city would
not collect garbage without a sticker on it. Households could also purchase a $.40 sticker
for a 16 gallon bag. Recyclable materials would continue to be collected free of charge, and
participation remained voluntary.
These events provide a natural experiment to study household response to price.
Following the decision of the city council in December 1991, we began to assemble our
sample of households. We first selected a sample of city streets spread throughout the City
of Charlottesville. This sample of streets represents all major neighborhoods and
demographic groups.3 The city directory was then used to select a random sample of
households located on the selected set of streets.4 A total of 400 households received a
3We excluded streets located near the University of Virginia, to avoid sampling
university students who frequently leave town or change living locations. We also avoided
apartments and town-houses which often use dumpsters. With these exclusions, we then
selected streets that appeared to be distributed uniformly across a map of Charlottesville.
Density varies, so the sample is not random.
1This two-part selection process is designed to cluster households more than would a one-
step selection of households from the entirety of Charlottesville. This clustering was
necessary to reduce the costs and complications involved with weighing household garbage
each morning. Even though many households in the sample were located on the same street,
they were often located well apart from each other. Usually only one or two studied
households were located on any block.6
letterrequestingtheir participation in our study. The letter indicated that their garbage and
recyclable materiaJs would be weighed early in the morning over two four-week periods.
The letter aiso indicated that participating households would be expected to complete a
questionnaire and were assured that their answers would be held confidentiaL'
A total of 97 households agreed to participate, while another 68 households responded
that they would not participate. Several of the "no" responses included a note indicating that
the household would be moving during the period of the study. Of the 97 positive responses,
our final sample includes 75 with complete data.6
Each household's garbage and recyclable materials were weighed each week over four
weeks in late May and early June before the implementation of the unit-pricing program, and
again over four weeks in September following its implementation. Garbage was not weighed
during the week following Memorial day, to avoid the extra garbage that can be generated
over the three-day holiday weekend. We skipped July and August in order to avoid vacation
weeks, and to provide a short adjustment period. Care was taken throughout the term of the
study to avoid weighing yardwaste.' This involved some inspection of household garbage,
which was not a difficult task.
We also counted the number of cans of garbage presented by each household each
'The letter informed households that the Charlottesville City Council had been made
aware of this study, and had agreed to all terms. Households were also informed that they
would receive $5.00 for their time spent completing the questionnaire. Each letter includeda
stamped postcard which the household could return indicating whether it would be willing to
participate in the study.
6Several households were removed from the sample because the originaloccupants had
moved during the period of the study or because the building containedmore than one family
unit.Some otherhouseholds refused to complete the questionnaire.
'Residentsarenot supposed to mix yardwaste with regular garbage. Instead,
Charlottesville conducts special collection of yardwaste several times eachyear.Some
householdsstill included yardwaste with regular garbage, however, and we took care to
exclude it.7
week.Measuring volumepresentscertain difficulties, as householdsuseddifferent-sized
plastic bags or boxes as containers. Countingasmall plastic kitchen bag or box as one can
would not be appropriate. Therefore, we approximated a household's garbage by the number
of 32-gallon containers it would have filled. Following the implementation of the pricing
program, we measured volume by counting the number of stickers. Problems still arise with
this procedure, as households were allowed to attach stickers to any container of about 32
gallons in size. Several households used even larger containers. By counting stickers, we
determined only the volume for which they were charged rather than the precise volume of
garbage per se.
We recorded each week separately. However, household garbage and recycling
amounts can vaiy substantially from one week to the next. In act, to save on disposal costs,
several households presented garbage only every other week. Therefore, we average the
four weeks for each household before implementation, and we calculated a separate avenge
for each household over the four weeks following implementation. We are left with two
averaged observations for each household. The first observation represents an average
week's worth of garbage and recycling amounts at a price of zero, and the second
observation provides the same at a price of $.80.
With only a 25% positive response rate to our initial mailing, our sample could suffer
from the presence of a self-selection bias. For example, it could be suggested that only
educated, environmentally-aware households would agree to have their garbage weighed each
week. These households may have already been recycling as much as they could before the
implementation of the unit-pricing program, leaving little opportunity for additional
recycling. Conclusions based on such a sample might under-estimate the increase in
recycling of an average household in Charlottesville.8
The data do not allow us to conduct a formal test for selection bias. We can make
some general observations, however, by comparing the means of garbage and recycling
weights of households in the sample with those for all households in Charlottesville. Mean
demographic characteristics can be compared as well.
The first column of Table 1 summarizes data gathered from our sample of 75
households, and the second column summarizes data from the entire City of Charlottesville.
Garbage and recycling informationfor the city was providedby the Rivanna Solid Waste
Authority (RSWA).Forcomparability with earlier studies, both columns provide amounts
per capita. The avenge individual in our sample presented 10.89 pounds of garbage per
weekbefore unit-pricing began.For all of Charlottesville, RSWA data includes both
residential andcommercial waste.Totalgarbage dividedby the totalnumber ofindividuals
amountsto 37.30 pounds of garbageperperson overan average weekbefore unit-pricing.
Following implementation of the program, the avenge individual in our sample decreased the
weight of garbage by 1.52 pounds per week, whereas the avenge person in Charlottesville
reduced the weight of garbage by 2.59 pounds per week.' This change for the city could
include changes in commercial waste. Commercial establishments that do not use dumpsters
are subject to the volume-based pricing program.
The data on recycling indicate that the average person in our sample recycled 3.69
pounds per week before the implementation of the pricing program, 0.95 pounds more than
the avenge person in Charlottesville. Theaverage household in our sample recycled more
than the avenge household in Charlottesville following the implementation of thepricing
last figure is adjusted for seasonal variation. Over a 5-year period prior to unit-
pncing,0.88 more poundsofgarbageper person per week were collected in June than in
September. Thestudentpopulation and household yardwastecouldaccount for much of the
city'sseasonalvariation.Sinceour sampleexcludesboth ofthesesources, we assumethat
noseasonaladjustmentis appropriatefor our sample.9
program aswell. Surprisingly,it appears that theavenge personinCharlottesvillereduced
the weight of recyclable material from 2.74 pounds per week to 2.46 pounds per week
following the implementation of unit-pricing. An inspection of the RSWA data reveals that
this reductionis due to a decreasein the recycling of old newspaper. RSWA officials can
offer no explanation for this decrease in newspaper recycling.9 Perhaps households, over
time, found the cost of storing newspapers to be higher than first expected.
Demographic information for the city is taken from the U.S. Census. However, the
U.S. Census data include both students in university dormitories and persons in multi-family
dwellings, which together comprise 31.1 % of all housing in Charlottesville. Therefore, our
exclusion of neighborhoods with students and apartments likely explains a significant portion
of the differences between our sample and the entire city for demographic variables. Our
households live in single-family dwellings, so they have higher values for income,
homeownership, age, employment, and education.
Measurement error can arise from several sources in our data. First, rain can
increase the weight of garbage and recyclable material. It rained heavily on two mornings
during the period of the study, so we did not use those observations.'0 Second, households
may have learned that the recycling truck does not collect in certain parts of the city until
well into the afternoon. If so, they might wait until the afternoon to present their recyclable
9This result is maintained even with correction for seasonal variation. Households in the
City recycled an average of 181.55 tons from November 1991 to June 1992, before the
implementation of unit-pricing, and recycled an average of 173.89 tons over these same
months after implement3tion. This overall reduction is still attributable to a reduction in the
recycling of old newspaper.
'°We did note whether each household presented any garbage for collection. If so, we
designated the following week's garbage as one week's worth. If not, the following week's
garbage was assumed to represent two week's worth (or the number of weeks since the last
presentation). The same algorithm was followed for recyclable material.10
materials for collection. Unfortunately, we could only measure amounts put out by 7:00
AM. On one occasion we returned to households that did not recycle in the morning, and no
additional recycling was observed. Finally, as mentioned above, the volume.of garbage
containersused byhouseholds could differ. Instead of measuring the volume of each
container, we measured volume the same way the city does —bycounting containers.
Following the measurement period, each household was sent a questionnaire with a
self-addressed stamped envelope. Completed questionnaires reported each household's
demographic statistics such as household size, ages, race, income, marital status, education,
and other information that could be expected to influence the generation of garbage or
recyclable materials. Households were also given the opportunity to express their opinions
on several subjects relating to recycling and the unit-pricing program. Some of their
responses are reported in Table 2.
Support for the sticker program runs fairly high, with 77.7% of households favoring
it over an increase in property taxes, and 72.8% favoring it over a mandatory recycling
law)' However, households found it more inconvenient to purchase and place stickers on
their garbage than to recycle. Households had been recycling for more than one year at the
time of completing the questionnaire, and may have become accustomed to it, whereas the
sticker program was relatively new to them. See Oskamp et al. (1991) or Seattle Solid
Waste Utility (1991) for more elaborate survey studies.
3. A Model of Household Demand For Garbage Removal
We assume that individuals maximize a utility function, defined over consumption and
"Among only owner-occupied households, 79% prefer unit-pricing to an increase in
property taxes.11
several methodsof garbageremoval,subject to a budget constraint. Thismaximization
processprovides a demand for each method of garbage disposal that is a function of the
prices, of income, and of taste parameters which themselves depend on demographic
characteristics.'2 We observe the quantity of garbagecollectionand recycling demanded by
each household, and these demands are estimated in this section. The use of other forms of
garbage removal can only be proxied by household responses to a questionnaire, and these
are estimated in a later section.
In previous studies using cross-sections of cities, garbage per capita is a function of
price and the city's mean level of income per capita, percent married, percent homeowners,
percent in each age group, and other demographic variables. To be comparable, we divide
all quantities by the number of persons in each household. These variables are defined in
Table 3.
Four separate equations were independently estimated: for per-capita weight of
garbage, volume of garbage, density of garbage, and weight of recycling.'3 In all these
estimations, we use panel data gathered from N=75 households over T=2 regimes. These
two regimes are the periods of time before and after the implementation of the unit-pricing
program. Let Y1 denote the per-capita weight of garbage (or volume of garbage, or density
of garbage, or weight of recyclable materials, depending on the equation) presented for
collection over an average week by household i during regime t. Initially, we assume that
'2First order conditions from this type of maximization are shown in Fullerton and
Kinnaman (1993), where we proceed to solve for optima] tax and subsidy rates on garbage
and recycling, in the presence of externalities. This simple formulation ignores differences
in the level of service (curbside vs backdoor collection), and time spent on these chores
(Wertz, 1976).
'3flensity is just weight divided by volume, or pounds per can. The four equations could
be estimated together, using seemingly unrelated regressions, but results are unaffected
because all four equations use the same right-hand variables.12
Yg can berepresentedas a linear function of the price of garbage collectionduring regime
(PJ,exogenousincome anddemographic variables that are constant across regimes for
householdi (the lxK vector X1), and a household-specific, time-invariant unobserved factor
(jQ)4 We assume that z1 is distributed independent of X1, the demographic variables. The
demand for the collection of household garbage can then be represented by
(I) Yg=a+ Pfl + X,y + +
where the unknown parameters are a, fi, and the (Xxi) vector .
Because of the appearance of, the error term for a particular household will be
correlated across regimes. Thereforewe usethe Generalized Least Squares (61.5) estimator
to provide efficient estimates of the unknown parameters.
3.1 Garbage Weight
First, we estimate the effect of the price of garbage and demographic characteristics
on the per-capita weight of garbage presented for collection each week. All of our variables
aredefined in Table 3, and GLS estimatesofthe unknown parameters appear in Table 4. In
the first column, for weight per person, the coefficient on price is negative and significantly
different from zero at the 95 percent confidence level. Using this coefficient, the price
elasticityof demand for the collection of garbage, measured in pounds, at mean levels of
price and weight is equal to -0.075. This estimate is a bit closer to zero than in previous
'4We need p because the Breusch and Pagan Lagrange multiplier test rejected the null
hypothesis that a = 0 for all equations, at the .99 confidence level. We do not want to
estimate p as fixed-effects, however, because then we could not measurecoefficientsfor
demographic variables. Since Xi do not change, first differences would leave àY as a
function only of aP. Fortunately, we can treatMe as random.Ina Hausman test, we cannot
reject the null hypothesis that p is independent of Xi.13
studies.'5
Owner-occupied householdspresented4.41more poundsper person than renters did,
controllingfor other differences. Homeowners usually conduct more home repairs and
maintenance than renters do, activities which generate more waste. Households with
individuals who work full-time presented 5.32 fewer pounds of garbage each week, perhaps
because they were away from home more of the time. Households with retired persons
presented less garbage weight on average, than did others.
We include household size in order to capture economies of scale, that is, the
reduction in pounds-per-person from having a larger household. We use the natural log of
household size, however, to allow the change in the pounds-per-person to vary across
household sizes. In this case, an increase in household size from 2 to 3 is found to reduce
weight of garbage by 2.44 pounds per person, while an increase in household size from 5to
6 is found to reduce garbage weight by only 0.97 pounds per person.
The coefficient on the natural log of income is slightly positive, but the standard error
is large. The income elasticity generated from this coefficient is 0.049, at mean levels of
income and garbage weight. Coincidentally, this estimate exactly matches that of Hong,
Adams, and Love (1993) using individual data. it.ssmaller than has been found using uu.s
kindsof data'6
'5We measure an arc-elasticity, since price is only zero or eighty-cents. No other study
employs a cross-section of households around the start of unit-pricing. Using aggregate data,
others have estimated the price elasticity to be -0.12 (Jenkins, 1991), -0.15 (Wertz, 1976), -
0.26and -0.22 (Moths and Byrd, 1990, in two communities), and -0.14 (Skumatz and
Breckinridge, 1990).
'6Although ours is the only estimate based on weight of garbage in a cross-section of
households, other kinds of data have been used to estimate this income elasticity. Richardson
and Havlicek (1978) estimate 0.242, Wertz (1976) estimates 0.279 and 0.242 in two different
samples, Petrovic and Jaffee (1978) estimate 0.2, and Jenkins (1991) estimates 0.41.14
The coefficient on race is perhaps the most surprising. White households presented
5.93fewerpounds per person for collection each week than non-white households." As
indicated in Table 1, however, only four of our 75 households were non-white. In addition,
all of these non-white households Eve within the same neighborhood. As a consequence, this
variable could represent just a neighborhood effect.
3.2 Garbage Volume
Second, we estimate how the per-capita volume of garbage is affected by the same set
of independent variables. The OLS estimates of the coefficients of this equation appear in
the second column of Table 4.
The sign of each coefficient in the volume equation is identical to that in the weight
equation for every variable except income. In both equations, however, the coefficient on
income is small and insignificant. We might have expected the volume demanded to increase
with income, but the volume of garbage is not well measured by the number of cans. High-
income households often used larger, sturdier containers with wheels. They are also more
apt to use garbage compactors. Low-income households typically have containers with no
wheels, so they may carry two light cans to the curb instead of one heavy can. In the long
run, with unit-pricing, we could expect everyone to purchase larger containers with wheels in
order to decrease disposal costs.
The price elasticity of demand, measured in volume, at mean levels of price and
volume is -0.227. By comparing this price elasticity to the one for weight given in the
previous section, we see that individuals responded to the volume-based pricing program by
reducing the volume of garbage in greater proportions than they reduced the weight of
"Richardson and Havlicek (1978) consider the effects of race on garbage generation and
find no significant relationship. Richardson and Havlicek (1974) find a positive relationship
between percent-black and garbage-weight.15
garbage. This result is not surprising since, alter all, the price is charged for the number of
bags of garbage rather than the weight. Unfortunately, however, landfill costs depend on
weight (or reallyoncompacted volume, which is best proxied by weight).
3.3 Garbage Density
The third column of Table 4 shows how the price per can of garbage and various
demographic characteristics affect the density of garbage as defined by weight per can. The
coefficient on price is positive, large, and significantly different from zero at the 95%
confidence level. Controlling for price and other variables, households with infants
presented garbage that weighed 11.55 more pounds per can than did others. (As those who
are parents know, wet disposable diapers are rolled into a tight, dense ball, held with tape,
before disposal.) As the education level of the household increases, the density of its
garbage decreases. Lastly, larger families present denser garbage.
3.4Weight of Recyclable Materials
The fourth equationconsiders the demand for the collection of recyclable materials,
measured by weight, with estimates appearing in the fourth column of Table 4. Households
respond to a price for garbage by increasing their recycling. The implied cross-price
elasticity is 0.074 at mean levelsY
Homeowners and households subscribing to additional daily newspapers put greater
amounts of recyclable material into collection containers. The coefficient on NEWSis
significantly different from zero in the recycling equation, whereas it was not significant in
any garbage equation. Less collection of recyclable materials was demanded by large
households and those with retired persons.
'8Usingonly twoobservations from each community, U.S. EPA (1990) estimates this
cross-price elasticity for Perkasie,PA (0.49), Illion,NY (0.48),andSeattle (0.06in 1985-6
and0.10in1986-87).16
4. VaryIng Parameters in the Demand For Garbage and Recycling
In this section, we consider interaction terms which allow the coefficient on price to
vary over demographic characteristics. This model will allow us to estimate how these
demographic characteristics affect the change in weight or volume of garbage that results
from the start of a price per bag. These estimates would be helpful to a local government
that is considering the implementation of such a program in its community. Specifically, we
modify equation (I) to add interaction terms with P1 times every X, giving us:
(2)
In this case we can take first differences, since the interaction terms remain:
(3)
where 4€ is an error with mean zero, distributed independently of X. For this fixed-effects
model, the OLS estimator is efficient, In other words, since AP is always 0.8, we just
regress AY on a constant, income, and demographic variables.
Again four separate equations were estimated, for garbage in pounds, garbage in
volume, the density of garbage, and recyclable materials in pounds. The OLS estimates are
reported in Table 5.
Thefirst column of Table S reports the estimated coefficients for the garbage weight
equation. This negative price effect (the constant term) is dampened for households that
subscribe to more daily newspapers, for those with infants, and for households with married
couples. Perhaps households with infants, whose garbage contains a large proportion of17
disposablediapers, are not willing toswitch from disposabletoclothdiapers.Interestingly,
thereduction in garbageinresponsetothe unit-fee is greaterforhigherincome households
thanforlower income households.
Thesecondcolumn of Table 5 presentsestimatedcoefficientsofthe demand for
collectionofgarbagevolume.Thesecoefficients aresimilar in signto thecoefficients
estimated in the garbage weight equation.
Who stomped ontheirgarbage in response to the implementation of the volume-based
pricing program? In column3 ofTable 5,weestimate howdemographiccharacteristics
affect the change in garbage density. None of the coefficients are significantly differentfrom
zero, but the signs for RETIRE and INCOME are negative. Retirees probably find stomping
difficult, especially when it would require hauling the dense garbage to the curb. Individuals
with high incomes apparently fmd the economic incentive less attractive, given the
opportunity cost of their time. Households with married couples, those with infants, and
large households appear to react by increasing the density of their garbage.
One possible solution tothestomping problem would be to implement a weight-based
insteadofa volume-based pricing system. Households would be billed according to the
weight of their garbage. This system would require scales on collection trucks and a more
elaborate billing system.'9
The fourth column of Table 5presentsthe estimated coefficients for the recycling
equation. Households with infants and those subscribing to more newspapers responded to
the implementation of the unit-pricing program by recycling more. White households
'9The city of Seattle has been considering the implementation of a weight-based system in
their city later in this decade. A pilot project (Seattle Solid Waste Utility, 1991) revealed
that operation and administrative costs of such a program would not be prohibitive. A
problem, however, is that scales were not sensitive enough to meet federal standards for
weights and measures.18
responded by recycling less than non-white households.
5. Unobserved Methods of Garbage Removal
As householdsaremade to face a positive marginal cost for garbage collection, they
have several options available to reduce the amount of garbage they present for collection.
Each household was asked to reveal which methods it had used. Each household could
indicate that it (1) did not attempt to reduce its garbage, or that it had (2) recycled more, (3)
composted more, (4) demanded less packaging at stores, or (5) used "other" means to reduce
its garbage. We wanted to know which households disposed of garbage in some illegal
fashion, but we did not ask such a question directly since households would be reluctant to
admit it. Since the first four options would seem to cover all possible legal alternatives,
however, we think the "other" option can only mean illegal disposal such as burning,
littering,or usingcommercial dumpsters!°
We have gathered data on the weight of each household's garbage and recyclable
material, so we can determine to some extent the accuracy of these responses. Table 6
shows the change in the weight of garbage, the change in the volume of garbage, and the
change in the weight of recyclable material, for households choosing each method of garbage
reduction in the questionnaire.
For households indicating they "did not reduce" their garbage, the actual weight of
garbage fell by only 0.05 pounds per person per week. This amount is substantially lower
than the 1.53 pound average reduction perperson observed overall. This subset also reduced
their volume of garbage by 0.25 containersper person per week, so they may have done
20The questionnaire did not include an option forputting more food through an in-sink
garbage disposai, but the change in this behavior must be small.19
some stomping.
For householdsindicatingthey"recycled more,"actual recycling increased by0.70
pounds perperson per week. This amount is somewhat greaterthanthe increase of 0.58
poundsobserved from all households, but it exceeds more substantially the increase of 0.35
poundsperpersonperweekobservedfromthehouseholds that didnot indicatethey
"recycledmore." In addition, households may indicate more than one of the four methods of
reducing its garbage. For households indicating they "composted more" the weight of
garbagefell by 2.25 pounds perperson per week. Littleof thisamountreappeared as
additional recycling,so thatgarbage doesseem tohavebeen removedfromthe waste stream.
Forhouseholds that indicated they "demandedless packaging atstores," the weight of
garbage andofrecycling both increased, by 1.26 pounds andby0.66 pounds perpersonper
week,respectively. That they were unable to reducegarbageis not entirelysurprising.We
doubt the ability of households to reducesubstantiallytheir garbagethroughthis methodover
the short time period of our study. We offer no explanation for why garbage and recycling
increased, except measurement error.
Finally, for households indicating they used "other" means, actual garbage fell by
5.10 pounds per personperweek. This figure ismore thantwice theamountassociatedwith
anyother answer to the question about whichmethods were used to reduce household
garbage. The weight of recyclable material decreased for these households as well. In fact,
several of these households presented no garbage at all following the implementation of unit-
pricing.2' We return to the issue of illegal dumping in the next section.
Wenow turn to an econometric model of household choice for each of four methods
21Several households presented recyclable material and g garbage for the entire four-
weekobservation periodfollowingimplementation. Wedeletedhouseholdsthat were on
vacation, as revealed inthe questionnaire.20
available to reduce garbage in responsetothe implementation of unit-pricing. For this
model, we have only one observation per household. Let Ybethe value to household i of
choosing a method to reduce garbage. Furthermore, assume that
(4)
whereX represent demographicvariables.Wedonot observer,but wedo observe
(5) Yj1 if Y>0
=0 otherwise
Inother words, we observethe choice made by each household. We assume jZj is
distributedNormal(o, 2), so weemploy the basic probit model.Maximumlikelihood
estimates ofy arereported in Table7.
Thefirstcolumnof Table7 reportsthe estimatedcoefficients ofvariablesexpected to
influencethe probability of a household choosing torecyclemorC following the
implementation ofunit-pricing.Although thesmall sample precludeshight-statistics,
recyclingseems more likely for households subscribingto morenewspapers,owner-occupied
households, andbetter educated households.Households subscribing tomore newspapers
mayhave selectedthis choicebecausenewsprint is relatively easy for ahousehold to recycle.
Householdswithinfants and with high incomelevelswere less likely to chooserecyclingas a
methodof reducinggarbage. The opportunity cost of recycling may be high for households
withhigher incomes.
The second column of Table 7 reports theestimatedcoefficients of variablesexpected21
to influence the probability of a household choosing to compost. Owner-occupied households
and better educated households are more likely to compost. Owner-occupied households
could have more yard space and could perform more yardwork themselves, circumstances
that are conducive to composting.
Thefourthcolumn of Table7 providesestimates for the "other" equation. Other
methods are less likely to be chosen by households with an in-sink garbage disposal and by
those with children. Several "other" methods of garbage reduction could have been chosen
by the household, including illegal methods discussed in the next section.
6. Illegal Dumping Behavior
The possibility of increases in illegal forms of garbage disposal have wonied
policymakers who have considered unit-pricing in their communities. We offer a method of
estimating the amount of illegal dumping that took place in Charlottesville during the period
of our experiment.22 We use two criteria. We suspect illegal dumping only if (a) the
household indicated that "other" means were used to reduce garbage, 4 (b) the amount of
garbage presented for collection fell to zero for the entire four-week measurement period
following implementation of unit-pricing. If the number of bags presented for collection
decreased from 3 in May to 2 in September, then we are willing to believe that the household
found a legal form of "other" disposal such as the use of an in-sink garbage disposal.
However, if the number of bags fell from 3 to 0, then we suspect more strongly that illegal
dumping has occurred. If a person goes to the trouble of transporting trash to a commercial
Blume (1991) attempts to explain illegal dumping by conducting interviews with
officials from 14 communities with unit-pricing programs. Of these, 4 reported significant
problems, 4 reported minor problems, and 6 reported no significant problems. Blume was
unable to explain what causes these differences across communities, even having considered
the price of garbage collection.22
dumpster, he or she will probably take the entire week's store of trash rather than one bag.
Based on the above criteria, we find that 5.33% of households disposed of garbage in
some illegalfashion." To estimatethe amount, we take their garbage before unit-pricing,
minus the increase in their recycling, minus an estimate of additional composting? We
find that these households dumped an avenge of 13.38 pounds per person per week. Given
the sample size, the implication is that unit-pricing induced an additional 0.42 pounds per
person per week of illegal dumping in Charlottesville. Furthermore, this estimate constitutes
28% of the total reduction in garbage at the curb. For comparison, additional recycling
constitutes38%ofthe total reductionin garbage. Thus households may have increased
dumping by almost as much as they increasedrecycling! Theremaining 34% of the total
reduction in garbage could be explained by additional composting, less packaging demanded
at stores, additional recycling at drop-off locations, or even additional illegal dumping.
The social costs can vary over methods of illegal dumping. For example, if a person
takes the weekly garbage to a commercial dumpster where he is employed, and has
permission from his employer, the social costs could be quite low. However, if this
individual throws his garbage along a rural route or bums it in his back yard, the social cost
could be quite large. Unfortunately, we have no means to idenflty what kind of "othe?
methods were used by households in our study.
23These results should be viewed with caution. First, the sample size is small. Only 4
households in our sample met our dual criteria for dumping. Second, our sample includes a
disproportionate number of high income, well educated, single family households. Third,
households who dump could have selected themselves out of our sample either by refusing to
participate in the study or by refusing to return the questionnaire.
Some households indicated more composting as well as 'other methods. Weregress
the change in garbage on the same demographic variables and a dummy variable for
composting. The coefficient on this dummy gives us an estimate of the per capita change in
garbage attributable to composting.23
Recent stories in newspapers tell of increased dumping." The recycling coordinator
of theUniversityof Virginia is aware of "many, many" private reports of individuals
dumping in UVA dumpsters. The Albemarle school system has also observed quantities of
unidentified garbage in their dumpsters. One person who was warned tostop dumping his
garbage in a commercial dumpster was subsequently convicted for continuing the practice.
Major department stores around Charlottesville have placed locks on their dumpsters to
prevent residents from dumping their garbage. Over 40% of households in our sample stated
that they had observed more littering since the implementation of the stickerprogram (see
Table 2). Of those observing "a lot" of littering, 75.0% lived in densely-populatedareas of
the city near downtown.
To get a handle on JhI might do such dumping, we estimate another probit model.
We wonder which demographic characteristics influence the probability of a household
choosing to dump their garbage in this fashion. These results are reported in the first
column of Table 8.
The equation estimating the probability of dumpingmay not be well specified, as no
coefficient is different from zero at the 95% confidence level. Perhaps dumping behavior is
difficult to predict without unobserved characteristics such as the degree of riskaversion,
community awareness, or accessibility to commercial dumpsters. Also, perhaps households
were not dumping illegally, even when their garbage fell to zero. On the other hand, the
model easily passes the test for joint significance of all these variables together.
A few other households presented no garbage following the price hike, were not on
vacation, and did not indicate that "other methods were employed to reduce garbage. These
"The Charlottesville Daily Proness, Thesday October 26, 1993,"Illegal Dumping has
County, Landowners Sifting for Answers", tells of increased dumping at more than 30 illegal
dumpsites scattered around the county.24
households may have reduced their garbage to zero through recycling, composting, and by
demanding less packaging, or they could have used illegal methods without acknowledging it.
Thesecond column of Table 8 reports the coefficientsonvariablesexpected toinfluence the
probability of a household reducingits garbageto zero, whether or notit indicated that
"other" methods were used. Individually the variablesarenot significant, again, but jointly
the variablesare significant.26
7. Discussion of Policy Issues
7.1 Revenue To The Municipal Government
A communitymay be interested in the amount of revenue it could earn with a unit
pricingprogram. Theserevenuescouldbe used to finance recycling collectionprogramsand
to pay. tipping fees. Based on our results, at mean values forCharlottesville, the additional
revenuewould be $0.86 per single-family household per week.
Several economic arguments favor unit-charges for garbage as a source of revenue.
First, such charges can help reduce the city's garbage and thus its expenditures on disposal.
Second, garbage collection anddisposalis not a "public good". Each bag incurs additional
cost (rival), and collection can be limited to those with paid stickers (excludable). Third, the
"benefit principle" suggests that such charges are "fair", since each household pays only
according to its use of this service. Fourth, we find that the demand for garbage is inelastic.
Established optimal tax theories suggest that the total dead-weight loss to an economy can be
reduced by taxing goods with inelastic demand
Other arguments can be made against this type of taxation. First, administrative and
261f we assume these additional households dumped or burned garbage illegally, then we
find that 9.33% of households in our sample dumped an average of 11.26 pounds of garbage
per person per week, representing 43.0% of the total reduction in garbage at the curb.25
enforcement costs may be higher than for other sources of revenue. Second, the social cost
of non-compliance can be large. Illegal dumping could require costly cleanups of backwoods
dump sites. Third, our results suggest the tax on garbage is regressive. With unit-pricing,
the volume of garbage varies from 0.55 containers per person for the lowest incomegroup to
0.46 containers per person for the highest income group. Thus high-income households
would pay a lower fraction of their income in garbage fees. Fourth, communities that use
property taxes to payfor garbagecollection enable their residents to deduct those local taxes
against their federal income tax. Depending on the number who itemize, and their marginal
tax rates, this deduction can pass to the federal government up to 30% of the cost of this
local public service. Jf the community switches to unit-pricing, it loses a substantial federal
subsidy on this portion of revenue.
7.2 A One-Bag Minimum
Some other communities with unit-pricing have tried to reduce illegal dumping by
requiring households to purchase a minimum of one bag each week. Households pay for this
first bag either through an annual flat fee or through property taxes, and they must purchase
stickers only for additional bags they place at the curb. The advantage of a one-bag
minimum is that households who would otherwise dump their garbage might be expected to
present at least one bag for collection each week. The disadvantage is that no households
have any economic incentive to reduce garbage below one bag per week.
We can calculate the effects of such a policy in Charlottesville, if we assume (a) that
households dumping all of their garbage would now only dump garbage in excess of one bag,
(b) that their regular garbage would increase by the amount not dumped, and (c) that other
households presenting up to one bag of garbage per week are unaffected by unit-pricing.
With these assumptions, and a one-bag minimum, the amount of illegal dumping would26
decreasefrom0.42 to 0.07 pounds per person per week— an 83% reduction. These
householdsmight even stop dumping entirely since the savings from doing so decreases by
the price of one bag. Unit-pricing becomes less effective at reducing garbage, however,
because the amount not dumped becomes extra garbage and because behavior is unaffected
for the 32.6% of households in our sample that produced one or fewer bags of garbage over
an average week before the implementation of the price-per-bag. With unit-pricing and a
one-bag minimum, the avenge person in our sample would:
• reduce the weight of garbage by 1.04 pounds per week (compared to 1.52 pounds
per week in the absence of a one-bag minimum)
• reduce the volume of garbage by 0.21 containers per week (compared to 0.27
containers per week in the absence of a one-bag minimum)
• increase the weight of recyclable material presented for collection by 0.50 pounds
per week (compared to 0.58 pounds per week in the absence of a one-bag minimum)
• increase the density of garbage by 4.44 pounds per container (compared to 4.69
pounds per container in the absence of a one-bag minimum).
The one-bag minimum would decrease dumping substantially, but it would also reduce
some of the desirable changes in garbage and recycling.
7.3 A Simple Cost-Benefit Analysis
What are the social benefits of a unit-pricing program? Repetto et a! (1992) use a
diagram like our Figure IA, where the demand for garbage collection is the marginal benefit
(MB). They also find that the social marginal cost (SMC) for a town like Charlottesville is
$1.03 per bag. Thus a price of zero generates too much garbage, and a price of $1 .03/bag
results in a welfare gain shown by the shaded triangle in Figure lÀ.
We follow Repetto a a] (1992) by assuming that the social marginal cost of garbage27
collection and disposal is $1.03 per bag. Charlottesville charges only $0.80per bag of
garbage. Therefore the benefit to Charlottesville from charging $0.80 is represented by the
shaded trapezoid in Figure lB. This gain is $3.14 per personper year.2'
Unit-pricing also imposes several types of costs, mostly administrative and
enforcement costs. The municipality must (I) pay to print and distribute the stickersto area
merchants, (2) pay to enforce laws against illegal dumpers, (3) pay to cleanup illegal dump
sites,and (4) pay to promote the program. Additional costs to the household arise from(5)
travelingto outlets that sell the garbage stickers, (6) spending time and effort tocompact
more garbage into each container, and (7) spending time and effort to dump their garbage.
Further costs to private business include (8) locking dumpsters and (9)paying to remove
garbage that has been dumped on their property. These costs are difficult to quantify,so we
consider three cases. We assume that the sum of these administrative and enforcementcosts
amounts to 5%,10%,or 15% of the price of a garbage sticker. Then the cost of a per-bag
pricing program can be represented by the shaded rectangle in Figure lB.
Table 9 summarizes these estimated benefits and costs of a unit-pricingprogram. In
the first row of the table, where we ignore illegal dumping, the estimated benefits of unit-
pricing exceed costs that are 5%or10% of the sticker price, but not costs that are 15% of
the sticker price.
The next two rows allow for our two measures of illegal dumping. To be
conservative, we ignore the cost of cleaning up backwoods dump sites. Instead,suppose
illegal dumpers just use commercial dumpsters. In this case the "true" reduction in garbage
at the landfill would be less than the reduction in garbage observed at the curb. The "true"
2'We ignore the benefits of additional recycling and composting. The price of
recyclables is near zero or less than zero for most types of material. See Baumol (1977) for
a good discussion of the possible costs and benefits to recycling.28
demandcurve in FigurelB is steeper, so the welfare gain trapezoid is smaller gj4thecost
rectangle is larger.Benefitsinthesecondandthird rowofthetable exceedcosts that are
5%ofthesticker price,butnot costs that are10%or 15% of the sticker price.
As mentioned above, household behavior is affected if per-bag pricing is accompanied
by a one-bag minimum. Dumping is less, but so is the reduction in garbage. The last three
rows of Table 9 provide estimated benefits and costs with this modified policy. Jn this case,
dumping is less relevant. In all three rows, we1tre gains are more than offset by
administrative costs that are only 10% of sticker revenue.
8. Conclusion
This paper has used original data gathered from individual households to estimate
household response to the implementation of a volume-based pricing program for the
collection of garbage. We find that households responded by reducing the weight and
volume of their garbage and by increasing the weight of their recyclable materiais. We also
find that households increased the density of their garbage as they engaged in stomping to
reduce their garbage bill. The favorite method to reduce garbage by households in our
sample was through additional recycling. Households also engaged in composting, less
packaging, and perhaps illegal dumping.
Many communities across the nation have implemented unit-pricing programs to
finance garbage collection, especially since 1987. Supporters of these programs emphasize
the reduction in garbage and the increase in recycling that can be expected to follow
implementation. Critics of these programs worry about excessive amounts of illegal dumping
as well as the administrative difficulties that may arise.
In general, we find the reduction in garbage weight and increase in recycling to be29
rathersmall. In fact, afteraccountingforillegal dumping, we estimate that total garbage
decreased byonly1.10pounds perperson perweek.Manyin Charlottesville werealready
participating in the voluntaiy recycling program before unit-pricing began.TABLE 1





Number of individuals 208 40,341
Number of households 75 16,009
Individuals per household 2.77 2.52
Avenge weight of garbage per week per individual 10.89 pounds 37.30 poundsb
before
Avenge weight of garbage per week per individual 9.37 pounds 33.83 poundsb
after
Avenge change in weight of garbage -1.52 pounds -2.59 poundsc
Average volume of garbage per week per individual 0.73 containers NA
before
Average volume of garbage per week per individual 0.46 containers0.34 containers
after
Average change in volume of garbage -0.27 containers NA
Avengeweight of recyclables perweek per individual3.69 pounds 2.74 pounds
before
Average weight of recyclables per week per individual4.27 pounds 2.46 pounds
after
Avenge change in weight of recyclables 0.58 pounds -0.28 pounds
% of households that set out any recycling before 73.3 65.0
% of households that set out any recycling after 69.6 65.4
Mean household income $46,267 $33,729
% of households owner-occupied 85.3 42.4
% of households married 65.3 51.4
% of households white 94.7 76.1
% of individuals under 3 years 3.9 3.8
% of individuals 18 to 26 years 9.6 23.4
% of individuals 26 to 64 years 54.3 46.4
% of individuals over 65 13.5 12.2
% of individuals work full-time 44.2 28.4
% of individuals over 25 with high school degree 92.2 75.5
% of individuals over 25 with bachelors degree 62.4 34.1
Garbage and recycling data for the entire city were provided by the Itivanna Solid Waste Authority.
NA means not available.
bTotalcity garbage includes commercial waste. Any increase of household trash put in commercial
dumpsters would be included in this figure.
This figure is adjusted for seasonal variation. Over the pervious 5 year period, 0.88 more pounds
of garbage per person per week were disposed of in June than in September. The student population
and household yardwaste account for much of the seasonal variation. Since our sample excludes both
of these sources, we assume that no seasonal adjustment is required to our sample data.TABLE 2
Household ResponsestoSelected Questions In Our Survey
Assuming thatthecity must facehigher costs forthe collectionand disposalof your
garbage, wouldyou rather have your propertytaxes increaseor participate in a sticker
programsuch as the one Charlottesvillecurrently hasimplemented to payforthe higher
costs?
Sticker 77.7% Property Tax 22.3%
Other cities across the United States have passed laws requiring households to recycle
certain material each week or they must pay a fine. Would you rather have such a law
insteadof the sticker program?
Yes 27.8% No 72.8%
How inconvenient is it for you to purchase and place stickers on your garbage?
Not Very 46.7%Somewhat 36.4% Very 11.7% Extremely 5.2%
How inconvenient isitfor you to place your newspaper, plastic, aluminum and tin in the
greenrecycling container?
Not Very75.3%Somewhat 14.3% Very 5.2% Extremely 5.2%
Doyou think the city of Charlottesville should collect a larger variety of recyclable
material from households each week?
Yes 86.9% No 13.1%
Have you observed a greater incidence of litter in Charlottesville since the sticker program
began in July?
Yes,A Lot15.6%Yes, A Little 24.7% No 59.7%
Have you experienced any problems with people stealing garbage stickers?
Yes 3.9% No 96.1%TABLE 3





WEIGHT 10.14 (6.48)Avenge weekly pounds of garbage per person in the household
VOLUME 0.60(0.32) The average weekly number of cans of garbage per person





PRICE 0.40 (0.40)The price paid by households for one can or bag of garbage
NEWS 0.47 (0.42)The number of daily delivered newspapers per person
OWN 0.85(0.36)1 -Theoccupants own the house
0- The occupants are renting the house
WORK 0.47 (0.36)The fraction of those in the household who work full-time
INFANT 0.03 (0.10)The fraction of those in the household less than the age of 3
CHILD 0.16 (0.23)The fraction of those in the household less than the age of 18
RETIRE 0.20 (0.35)The fraction of those in the household over the age of 65
COLLEGE 0.75 (0.44)1 -Atleast one person with some college lives in the household
0- No individual with some college
INC 4.63 (2.66)The household annual income level is.
1 -Lessthan 520,000 6- Between$40,000 and $80,000
3- Between $20,000 and $40,0009- Greater than $80,000
LINC 0.59 (0.48) Natural log of INC divided by the number of persons in the
household
MARRY 0.65 (0.51) 1 -Anadult married couple lives in the household
0- No married couple
WHITE 0.95 (0.28)1 -Awhite household
0- A non-white household
HHSIZE 0.90 (0.51) The number of individuals in the household (LHHSIZE =logof
}LHSIZE)
DISP 0.37 (0.49) 1 -Thehousehold has an in-sink garbage disposal
0 -Thehousehold does not have an in-sink garbage disposal
PET 0.36 (0.45) The number of pets (cats or dogs) per person in the householdTABLE 4
GLS Estimates of Coefficients in Demand Equations
Dependent Variable




CONSTANT 22.04 6.10 1.36 9.03 12.06 2.79 2.13 1.23
PRICE -1.91-2.22-0.34-7.17 5.87 3.85 0.73 1.84
NEWS 2.65 1.29 0.12 1.39 1.98 0.81 4.88 5.00
OWN 4.41 1.99 0.20 2.16 4.15 1.57 1.46 1.38
WORK -5.32-2.22-0.15-1.46-4.40 -1.54 -0.57 -0.50
INFANT -2.54-0.39-0.32-1.1911.55 1.50 -1.68 -0.55
RETIRE -4.71-1.79-0.14-1.32-5.08 -1.62 -1.99 -1.58
COLLEGE -3.03-1.91-0.02-0.32-5.12 -2.71 -0.03 -0.04
UNC 0.86 0.19-0.29-1.507.67 1.40 0.39 0.18
MARRY -0.93-0.65-0.10-1.70 0.59 0.34 -0.53 -0.77
WHITE -5.93-2.62-0.27-2.86-1.23 -0.46 0.00 0.008
LHT{SIZE -4.87-2.53-0.38-4.72 4.11 1.79 -1.11 -1.21 s 17.42 0.019 9.49 4.13
sIc 17.77 0.053 55.62 3.73
Number of observations =150.All variables are defined in Table 3. Descriptive statistics at the bottom
of the table show the goodness of fit. sIit is the estimated variance of the individual-specific effects
and 526 is the estimated variance of the remaining error term.TABLE 5
OLSEstimates of Coefficients In Varying-Parameter Demand Equations
Dependent Variable is the Change in:




CONSTANT-1.35 -0.27-0.58 -2.024.760.52 1.02 0.43
NEWS 4.58 1.60 0.21 1.314.690.90 2.97 2.21
OWN -2.91-0.94 -0.01 -0.05-2.45-0.43-0.85-0.58
WORK -0.28-0.08 -0.00 -0.02-2.68-0.44 1.88 1.19
INFANT 14.62 1.62 0.68 1.3215.400.94 6.72 1.58
RETIRE -0.33 -0.09 -0.10 -0.45-5.88-0.870.91 0.52
COLLEGE 1.59 0.72 0.07 0.58-2.17-0.540.43 0.41
LINC -5.34 -1.91 -0.13 -0.79-3.15-0.62-1.17-0.89
MARRY 3.45 1.71 0.12 1.014.95 1.35 0.64 0.67
WRITE -0.23 -0.07 0.04 0.230.75 0.13-2.17-1.45
LRHSIZE -0.54 -0.20 0.07 0.452.86 0.58-0.22-0.17
R2 0.195 0.116 0.148 0.149
F(l0.64) 1.555 0.836 1.113 1.125
Number of observations=75.All variables are defined in Table 3. Descriptive statistics at the




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Further Estimation Resultsfor ProbitChoice Model
Number of observatjons=75. All variables are defined in terms




'The household indicated it used bother" methods to reduce gaibage, and the household setno
garbage out for collection following the implementation of volume-based pricing.
bThe household may or may not indicate that other" methods were used, but the household set
no garbage out for collection following implementation.
DUMP! DUMP2b
Variable Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
CONSTANT -7.27 -1.18 -3.79 -1.30
NEWS 0.96 1.12 0.67 1.00
PET 1.01 1.83 0.68 1.93
DISP -2.23 -1.57 -1.46 -1.53
OWN -1.03 -0.94
SIZE 0.04 0.09 -0.59 -1.28
CHILD -0.16 -0.26 0.61 1.16
RETIRE 1.03 1.36 0.67 0.62
MARRY -1.62 -1.41 -1.59 -1.93
WORK -0.18 -0.36 0.29 0.62
WHITE 1.59 0.32 1.79 0.69
COLLEGE 0.20 0.67
INC 0.54 1.63 0.24 1.31
-2[L(0)-L(ft)] 31.23 46.53
-2[L(c)-L(J3)] 19.69 32.22A Simple Comparison of
TABLE 9
Benefits and Costs per Person per Year
Administrative and Enforcement Cost?
Assumption Benefits 5% 10% 15%
No Dumping $3.14 $1.32 $2.64 $3.96
DUMPP $2.19 $1.38 $2.76 $4.14
DIJMP2' $1.74 $1.41 $2.82 $4.23
1 Bag Minimum
No Dumping $2.49 $1.36 $2.72 $4.08
DIJMP1b $2.33 $1.37 $2.74 $4.11
DUMP? $1.90 $1.40 $2.80 $4.20
As a percentage of the price of the garbage sticker.
bWe include the missing garbage of households that indicated it used othert methods to reduce
garbage and set no garbage out for collection following the implementation of unit-pricing.
cWe include the missing garbage of households that may or may not have indicated that "other
methods were used, but set no garbage out for collection following implementation.Figure IA
Marginal Benefit (MB) and Social Marginal Cost (SMC)
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